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{. INTRODUCTION

Lamar's brief in opposition to KEC and in support of its cross appeal is riddled with
misstatements of fact.

KEC's cross-claim against Lamarjn the Kuntz action was for an

apportionment of fault under the rubric. of common law negligence, 1 It was not a substantive
claim made pursuant to the Idaho High Voltage Act (hereafter "HVA"). KEC obtained summary
judgment in the Kuntz action on the issue of whether Lamar's failure to give notice as required
by the HVA made Lamar n.egligent per se; and thus, al!tomatically liable to the Plaintiff Kuntz.
KEC did not argue that Lamar was liable to it as KEC had alleged no substantive causes of
action against Lamar.
Nor did KEC waive a right to potential recovery under the HVA during the conference on
jury instructions before the Honorable Judge Whaley.. Rather, KEC and .Lamar agreed with the
Court's conclusion .that no right to indemnification yet existed because no verdict had been
entered as to KEC who would otherwise be entitled to indemnity. In accordance with KEC's
partial summary judgment, Judge Whaley directed the jury to enter a judgment against Lamar for
its liability to Kootz. 2 Judge Whaley did not direct the jury to enter a judgment against Lamar
for any liability to KEC.
After the entry of the verdict and upon the triggering of its right to statutory indemnity,
KEC filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. It was not a motion to reallocate fault as

1
Irrespective of whether Idaho law on comparative fault and the conventions of pleading dictated that KEC was
automatically entitled to· apportionment or should have plead it as ·an affirmative defense as opposed to a crossclaim, the fact remains that the plain language of KEC's cross-claim shows it to be one for apportionment. (R .
. 33807, Vol. II, p. 330-31)
2
Judge Whaley also dire~ted the jury to apportion fault to the plaintiff Kuntz based upon his own negligence.
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Lamar repeatedly suggests (especially since the HVA provides for complete indemnification
from Lamar regardless of the percentage of fault allocated to KEC). (Resp. Br. at 9) The federal
court did not conclude "that KEC had waived its claim to indemnity." (Resp. Br. at 9) This is a
blatant misrepresentation. Rather, the federal court denied KEC's request to rule upon a newly
accrued claim thatit had not plead.during the course ofa.Jawsuitthat had proceeded to judgment.
In fact, Judge Whaley explicitly recognized that

KEC

had not plead any claim for statutory

indemnity under the HVA, stating "I've looked through the record and find that there was no
claim made by you [KEC] against Lamar in this court other than for apportionment of fault." (R.
33807, Vol. II, p. 367, L, 16-19) And fault was apportioned for the damages Lamar, KEC, and
Kuntz caused to Kuritz.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington has indeed made
rulings which are binding and have preclusive effect. Namely, Lamar did fail to give the notice
required by the HVA.

This was the factual .predicate for Lamar's liability to Kuntz.

Furthermore, KEC did not plead any right to recover under LC. §55-2404(2) in the underlying
federal action,3 and was not permitted by the Court to do so after the jury verdict was entered.
There is, however, no support for Lamar's argument that KEC actually pleaded and litigated its
right to statutory indemnity· under the HVA in the federal action such that res judicata bars it
from pursuing this right in Idaho state court. At issue is only whether res judicata bars KEC's
current claim for relief under the HVA, a claim which went unasserted in the federal suit as it
. was unripe,. premature, and purely permissive according to Idaho R. Civ. P. 13(g).
3

Lamar has previously sllitedthat "[n]owhere did KBC request or allege that its liability should be apportioned to
Kuntz orto Lamar pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 55-2404(2)." (R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 240)
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Intended or otherwise, the tenor of Lamar's brief suggests that this exercise in appellate
jurisprudence is

an academic because its position is inescapably true and correct.

It is almost

with .exasperation t)1at Lainar claims that res judicata must bar KEC's right to recover that to
which it is entitled by statute, as if no other possibility could be contemplated. And yet two
separate Courts struggled with the very same issues that Lamar describes in black and white
terms. Fully aware that KEC had. neither pleaded nor litigated a right to statutory indemnity
under the HVA, Judge Whaley anticipated and even encouraged an action in Idaho. After it was
filed on December 30, 2002, the parties engaged in several rounds of competing sunnnary
judgment motions.

In sum, KEC's motion for sunnnary judgment that it was entitled to

indemnity was gr!l:1ted. Lamar's motions for summary judgment that waiver, !aches, and ti).e
statute of limitations barredKEC's claim were denied. However, the trial court granted Lamar's
motion fot summary judgment on the issue of resjudicata. Notably, Judge Luster recognized
that Idaho courts had no1yet resolved .the application of res judicata to permissive cross claims,
and was forced to consult opinions from other jurisdictions to inform the issue and resolve the
debate.
Understanding that there is a contrary body of law, KEC has nonetheless provided this
court with ample authority to support its position and. to reverse the trial court's ruling. And in
entertaining KEC's request for relief, this court should consider what is truly inescapable. KEC
paid a share of the Kuntzjudgment in the amount of$9,965,752.00 based upon its own 50% fault
for Kuntz' s injuries as determined by a jury; but irrespective of the percentage fault apportioned
to KEC or the amount of damages awarded, KEC is entitled to recover it all from Lamar because
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of Lamar's statutory violation. This is the plain and unambiguous effect of the HVA, and such is
the right conferred upon KEC by the Idaho Legislature. And whether KEC's right to recover
under the HVA will be realized as intended depends on how this Court resolves the intersecting
doctrines of res j11dicata,'pertnissive cross-claims, and unripe claims for statutory indemnity.
With respect to Lamar's cross appeal on whether.the comparative fault scheme applies to
the HVA, it must be underscored that if Lamar, a Louisiana company with $600 million in gross
revenues, had made a 50¢ telephone call to KEC that work would be performed around the high
voltage overhead lines, it would have satisfied the statutory notice provision of the High Voltage
Act. KEC had policies in place to put ''cover ups'' 011 the high voltage lines. However, Lamar
admits that it failed to make that telephone call, resulting in statutory damages to KEC in the
amount of$9,965,752.00. Rather than reimburse KEC for the damages KEC incurred as a direct
violation,
Lamar ignores the.plain
language of the High Voltage Act
result of Lamiir' s statutory
-.
.
,'

and hides behind Idaho's comparative fault statutes.

If this Court reaches the issue of comparative fault, then KEC respectfully submits that
this Court should affirm Judge Luster's solid and well-reasoned ruling that "[t]here is no
question that the comparative analysis that was done by the federal court simply does not come

into play when this court applies the High Voltage Act and the indemnity provisions." (Tr.
88:18-21 (emphasis added)) Judge Luster reached this conclusion through a close examination of
the rules of statutory interpretation and common sense.
Further, acknowledging that Idaho does not have cases interpreting the HVA in tandem
with its comparative fault statutes, Judge Luster relied on cases from other states (namely
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Arizona and Wyoming) that have interpreted legislation virtually identical to Idaho's HV A.
However, in its cross appeal, L~ar fails to (1) address or distinguish these cases; (2) address the
trial court's Jegal rationale; or (3) apply the actual language contained in the HVA. Inexplicably,
Lamar invokes a tort-based scheme that has absolutely no application to penalties for a statutory
violation or statutory indemnification.

In effect, applying the tort-based comparative fault

scheme to the plain language of the HVA not only does"violence" to the HVA, but eviscerates
it; and renders it meaningless, This Court should rejectlegally unsubstantiated assertions and
impose the full statutory penalty on Lamar.
Finally, Laniar's su~gestion in its cross appeal that the statute of limitations bars KEC's
claim for statutory indemnification has been repeatedly.rejected by the trial court. Judge Luster
ruled that "there are certain principles from indemnification law that, as a practical matter, must
apply ill a case arising under the statute.

The general common law rule is that, in

indemnification cases, the cause of action does not accrue until damages have been awarded
against the party. seeking inde111t1ification.

Indemnification actions are separate from the

underlying wrong." {R. 33.807, Vol. IV, p. 847) Judge Luster relied on this Court's holding that
"unless liability of the claimed indemnitee to the third party is established, the right to
indemnification does not arise." Beitzel v. Orton, 121 Idaho 709, 717, 827 P.2d 1160, 1168
(1992). KEC had no ripe claim upon which to sue Lamar for "indemnification" until KEC
incurred "damages to third persons." Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2). No "damages to third persons"
were incurred by KEC until the jury verdict was returned and Judgment entered in the underlying
action. The jury returned its verdict on October 18, .2002, and Judgment was entered on or about
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October 29, 2002. Accordingly,
the statute of limitations for KEC's indemnification
claim began
.
.
.

'

to run on or about ()ctober 29, 2002. KEC filed suit against Lamar for indemnification on
December JO, 2002, well within the statute of limitations.
This Court should decline Lamar' invitation to adopt the. "immediate. damage" theory for
determining the accrual for indemnification, and triggering the statute of limitations. Lamar's
theory is not substantiated by Idaho's firmly established case law.
II. RESTATEMENTOFTHECASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintif£'Appellant KEC appeals from summary judgment dismissal of its statutory
indemnification claim filed pursuant to the High Voltage Act. The First Judicial District of Idaho
dismissed KEC's cl\iim on the premise that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, even
though KEC's claim had not accrued nor had it incurred damages in the underlying action until
judgment was entered against it.

The unasserted claim was unripe, premature, and purely

permissive accordingto Idaho R. Civ. P.13(g).
Defendant/Respondent/Cross Appellant Lamar cross appeals from a summary judgment
entered in favor ofKEC, which (a) dismissed Lamar's affirmative defense that KEC's statutory
indemnification claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (b) ruled that the comparative
fault/contribution statutes did not apply to a statutory claim for indemnification under the HVA.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

See Appellant KEC's Opening Brief at 10-17.
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C.

RESTATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

KEC's cross. claim for apportionment in the Kuntz action stated as follows:
That in the course of owning, maintaining and contracting the use of said sign,
defendant Lamar was negligent and in violation of the applicable rules,
regulations .and ·statutes governing outdoor advertising signs within specified
distances of high powered transmission lines. That the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by and/or. contributed to by.the negligence of Lamar; that liability should
be. apportioned between the respective. parties and. that judgment be entered in
accordance with the findings of the trier of fact.
(R. 30808, Vol. I, p. 30-31) KEC's prayer for relief asked "[f]or an apportionment of fault
between all parties to this litigation." (R. 30808, Vol. I, p. 3 r, L. 15-16)
Before trial in the Kuntz action, KEC filed a motion for partial summary judgment
against Kuntz and Lamar for their respective liability to Kuntz. Judge Whaley granted KEC's
motion, ruling that Kuntz "was a 'contractor,' and its statutory violation of the High Voltage Act
makes.it negligent as amatter of!aw." (R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 340, L. 22-24) Judge Whaley also
ruled that Lamar "is negligent as a matter of law for failing to provide notice." (R. 33807, Vol.
II, p. 342, L. 2-3) Kuntz also filed a motion for. partial summary judgment against KEC and
Lamar. (R. 33807, Vol. U, p. 347) Judge Whaley denied Kuntz's motion with respect to KEC,
ruling that because plaintiff's injury occurred on the portion of the high voltage overhead line
that complied with the National Electrical Safety Code requirements (rather than the phase of the
1

line that did not comply with the NESC and Kuntz did not touch), the noncompliance was not the
proximate cause of Kuntz's injuries. (R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 348, L. 1-8) However, the Court
granted Kuntz's motion for partial sununary judgment against Lamar, ruling that "Lamar
violated the High Voltagt; Act for failing to fulfill its obligation as a contractor to notify the
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utility." (R. 33807, Vol.

II, p. 349, L 18-20)

At trial, Judge Whaley directed the jury to enter a judgment against Lamar for its liability
to Kuntz, lllld to also apportion faµ.ltto Kuntz based upon his own negligence. (R. 33807, Vol. II,
p. 360-61) After the verdict was entered, KEC immediately moved to Amend or Alter the
Judgment to invoke its right to statutory indemnity, but was rebuffed by the federal court on
grounds that pleaqings could not be reopened lllld. amended after a trial to assert unpleaded
causes of action. (R. 33807, Vol. II, p, 367, L. 17-25; p. 368, L. 7-8; p. 370, L 13-15) The
federal court was clear that

KBC did not plead a right to statutory indemnity under the HVA

in

the Kuntz action. (Jd;) However, Judge Whaley fully e,.pected and encouraged KEC to plead its
right to indemnity in a proceeding before the State.Courts of Idaho. (R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 367, L.
21-25; p. 371,1.17-18)
The Court entered a formal Judgment on October 29, 2002. (R. 30808, Vol. I, p. 184-85)
KEC filed its Complaint against Lamar for statutory indemnity on December 30, 2002. (R.
30808, Vol. 1, p ..6-12) After the Ninth.Circuit appeal was completed in 2004, KEC paid a share

oftheKuntz Judgment to Kuntz in the amount of$9,965,752.00. (R. 33807, Vol. 1, p. 5-9)

Ill.
A.

RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

KEC's ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether KEC's asserted right to recover under Idaho's High Voltage Act should be
barred by res judicata even though this right was never pleaded and determined in the prior
federal action, and might not and should not have been pleaded because it: (a) was permissive;
(b) did not accrue or ripen until the. entry of the judgment in the prior action; and (c) KEC's
cross-claim for apportionment did not make KEC and Lamar adversarial for the purposes of
converting. unasserted claims into compulsory claims.
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B.

LAMAR'S ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL

1.
Whether the comparative fault or contribution statutes are wholly inapplicable to
KEC's claim for statutory indemnification pursuant to the High Voltage Act because: (a) KEC's
claim is based solely on statutory .damages it incurred as a result of Lamar's statutory violation of
the High Voltage Act and nof on. any ground of negligence; (b) the plain and unambiguous
language of the HVA imposes a non-delegable statutory penalty only on the contractor, not on
the. utility; and (c) the plain and unambiguous language of the HVA does not contain a
comparative fault qualifi~r or restriction.
·
2.
Whether KEC's claim for statutory indemnification was filed within the threeyear statute of lhnitationswhen its claim accrued on October 29, 2002-the date KEC incurred
· damages "to third persons" under the HVA when Judgment was entered-and KEC filed its
complaint against Lamar two months later, on December 30, 2002.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF TUE ARGUMENT OF KEC's APPEAL

The critical issue before the Court is whether res judicata .bars KEC's current right to
recover damages under the High Voltage Act. In maintaining that Judge Luster's ruling that res

judicata bars KEC's pending tight to indemnity was a correct one, Lamar relies upon repeated
mischaractetizations. as if the process· of repetition will transform its argument into· something
immutable and true ..It will not.
KEC did not plead a tight to statutory indemnity under the HVA in the Kuntz action.

(See Restatement of Facts, supra) Rather, KEC pleaded a right to an allocation of fault, a right
that exists separately from and is not codified by the HVA. Judge Luster did not conclude that
the "cause of action KEC asserted against Lamar in the Kuntz action and this action is the same violation of a duty owed to KEC under Idaho's HVA [.]" (Resp. Br. at 18) Judge Luster
concluded the opposite, stating "[t]he case now before this Court involves indemnification,
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which is a separate claim by KEC against Lamar. It is not a relitigation of Kuntz's claims
against KEC and Lamar." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 855)
The claim KEC asserts - indemnity - was not litigated in the federal court action to either
the court or the jury, nor was it resolved by way of KEC's post-trial motion. Judge Whaley
specifically refused to consider KEC's right to indemnification because it had not been pleaded.
(R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 3, L. 17-19 and p. 6, L. 13-15) It was not pleaded because it did not arise
until the entry of the jury verdict. 4 (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 847) After the verdict was entered,
KEC attempted to invoke its right to statutory indemnity, but was rebuffed by the federal court
on grounds that pleadings could not be reopened and amended after a trial to assert unplead

I causes of action. (See Restatement of Facts, supra) But Judge Whaley did not "reject" KEC's
indemnity claim. Quite the contrary, He fully expected KEC to plead its right to indemnity in a
proceeding before the
.. State. Courts ofldaho. (See Restatement of Facts, supra)
Next, KEG did not assert a substantive cross-claim against Lamar such that all its other
potential claims became compulsory. (See Resp. Br. at 19) KEC's cross-claim was for an
apportionment of fault against Lamar for the damages to Kuntz. KEC did not bring a crossclaim against Lamar for its own damages.
unrecognized right to indemnity.

Lamar's cross-claim against KEC was for an

(R. 33807, Vol. III, p. 568)

Neither cross-claims for

apportionment nor cross-claims for indemnity are substantive cross-claims for the purposes of
making parties adversaries and triggering operation .of the compulsory counterclaim rule.

Hemme v. Bharti, 183 S.W.3d 593,596 (Mo. 2006).
4

It is well-recognized that "the indemnity claim generally need not be litigated in the main action since there is no
right to recover until payment is made." STEIN TREATISE§ 14.56 ( 3d ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
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B.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO LAMAR'S
CROSS APPEAL

The HVA is desigl).ed to provide an entity like KEG with indemnity for damages to
persons like Kuntz when an entity like Lamar fails to give the notice required by the statute.
This is a significant part ofthe statute's purpose. The statute does not contain any qualifiers on
this right to recovery based upon the actions of an electrical utility, nor does the HVA require
that KEC give notice to Lamar.
Most importantly, KEC's right to recover under the HVAdoes not require it to be free of
fault. As Judge Luster noted, "it was the legislature's intention to provide for payment to a
public utility for damages where. the. notification provisions were violated by a contractor." (R.
33807, Vol. IV, p. 847) Thus, Lamar's selfsserving criticism of KEC's actions is completely
irrelevant to the statutory interpretation of the HVA and KEC's right to full statutory indemnity.
With regard to Lamar's statute of limitations cross-appeal, KEC respectfully submits that
this Court should affirm the trial court's numerous rulings .that KEC's claim was filed squarely
within the three-year statute of limitations. Judge Luster applied rules of statutory construction
and case law governing indemnification to support his ruling that KEC's claim was properly
filed within the statute oflimitations. (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 847~48) The trial court determined
that according to Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2), "the contractor is 'liable' for all costs and expenses,
including damages to third persons, incurred by the public utility as a result of the contact. The
costs and expenses incurred by the public utility as a result of the contact are not established until
some kind of judgment is entered or resolution is reached against the public utility, especially
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where damages to third parties are involved." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 848) Therefore, applying
the facts to the law, "the cause of action based upon Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2) accrued when the
jury returned a verdict in the federal court lawsuit and the judgment was entered against KEC on
October 29, 2002." (R. 3380?;Vol. IV, p. 848).
· Judge Lusteropirted that "[tlhe application of the concept of indemnification to claims on
liabilities arising under Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2) makes it consistent with other kinds of cases.
Furthermore, the parties have generaily considered this to be an 'indemnification' case so that it
is appropriate to apply those principles in determining when the cause of action accrues." (R.
33807, Vol. IV, p, 848)
In front of Judge Luster, Lamar repeatedly characterized KEC's claim as one for
"indemnification/' (See, e:g., R. 30808, Vol. 3, p. 539("These arguments are critical to the full
analysis of the statutory indemnity at issue herein[.]'' In fact, Lamar asked the trial court to
consider public policy "when determining the application and operation of the indemnity
statute." Id.)) However, Lamar abandons this characterization in its cross appeal, and selfservingly calls KEC's claim a "statutory tort." (Resp. Br. at 44)

Such a characterization,

however, fails to negate Lamar's statutory responsibility to reimburse, repay, compensate, refund

i

or indemnify KEC for damages it incurred when damages to "third persons" were fully
determined by the underlyingJudgment rendered on October 29, 2002. It is undisputed that those
damages resulted directly from Lamar's statutory violation. None of the parties would be before
this Court if Lamar.had made a 50¢ call to notify KEC that work would be performed near its
high voltage lines-regardless of how KEC reconfigured the Bayview/Chilco transmission lines.
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It is undisputed thatKEC only seeks statutory indemnity for the Judgment amount (not
costs and attorney fees), and likewise, it is undisputed that KEC filed the Complaint for
indemnity on December 30, 2002. Accordingly, KEC's claim was timely filed.

C.

RES JUD/CATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO KEC'S CLAIM FOR STATUTORY INDEMNIFICATION
BECAUSE TIIIS. CLAIM IS NOT THE SAME AS THE PRIOR. CROSS-CLAIM FOR
APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT, NOR IS TIJE CL.AIM ONE. WHICH MIGHT HAVE AND SHOULD
HAVE BEEN.LITIGATED lN THE FEDERAL SUIT,

Judge Luster ruled that resjudicata bars KEC's clairi:l.against Lamar in Idaho State Court
for recovery under the HVA because the claim might and should have been made in the prior
federal litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. (R.
33807, Vol. IV, p. 857) In. doing so, however, Judge Luster recognized that KEC's right to
indemnity had never actually been pleaded or litigated in the first proceeding, stating "[t]he
question of payment by Lamarfor.KEC's liability was never actually determined in the previous
case;'' (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 856) In other words, the trial court concluded that KEC's crossclaim for apportiomrient (which was litigated to final conclusion in the federal action) was not
the same claim as its pending claim of statutory indemnity under the HVA. 5 In spite of Lamar's
' assertions, both Judge Whaley and Judge Luster agreed that KEC' s claim for indemnity is a
separate and distinct claim that was not litigated either in. the prior trial or in the post-trial
proceedings. (Resp. Br. at 22)
Judge Luster's dismissal of KEC's claim for statutory indemnity was based upon his

5

Lamar even suggests that a cross-claim for apportionment is no\ really a proper claim at all since the doctrine of
comparative fault does not requke its pleading or "create any new legal theory, cause of action, or legal defense."
(Resp. Br. at 24) and see Idaho Code§ 6-801 and§ 6-802. · If this is the case, then KEC's misplead recitation of the
comparative fault of the parties is most certainly not the same claitri as a right to statutory indemnity under the HV A.
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decisi()n that KBC might and should have litigated its indemnity rights because they arose from
the. same transaction or event in accordance with Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157
P.3d 613 (2007) and Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994). Lamar
describes this transaction or event as "Kuntz' s contact with a high voltage wire causing him
serious injuries." (Resp.Br. at 22) But there are events that are indispensable to KBC's right to
statutory indemnity from Lamar for the damages KBC paid to Kuntz. They are the entry of a
verdict against KBC; and payment to Kuntz for the resulting damages to Kuntz.
KEC's cross-claim for apportionment arose in part from Kuntz's contact with a high
voltage wire andKuntz's and Lamar's failure to give notice as required by the HVA. KBC's
right to indenmity arose from the verdict establishing its liability to Kuntz for damages he
suffered, and the. sub$equent payment thereof. Until a verdict was entered, KBC had not suffered
or been forced to pay any d!!mages to third persons .under the HV A, and it is only these damages
to third persons (the judgment of $9,965,752.00 paid by KBC to Kuntz) which KBC seeks to
recover by way of its lawsuit. KBC' s cross-claim for apportionment could and did proceed to
judgment without a .prior judgment. KEC' s claim for statutory indemnity could not.
Judge Luster determined that KEC's right to recover damages to third persons under the
HVA was analogous to a common law right to indenmity against liability, stating "[t]he
application of.the concept of indemnification to claims on liabilities arising under Idaho Code§

55-2404(2) makes it consistent with other kinds of cases."

(R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 848)

Moreover, and significantly .with respect to the same transaction or event analysis under Ticor,
the Court correctly held that "[i]ndemnification actions are separate from the underlying wrong."
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(R. 33807, Vol. IV, p,. 847)
Similarly, KEC's claim for statutory indemnity is separate from the underlying wrongs
that gave risie to Kuntz's claims against Lamar and KEC; artd KEC's cross-claim for
apportionment of fault to Lamar and Kuntz for the damages suffered by Kuntz. The event upon
which KEC's current claim is predicated is the entry of the jury verdict on October 18, 2002.
This event fixed the liability of KEC to Kuntz, and triggiered a right which could not otherwise
arise. As the trial court stated, relying upon the. wisdom of this Court, "unless liability of the
claimed indemnitee to the third party is established, the. right to indemnification does not arise."
(R, 33807, Vol. IV, p. 847) Beitzel v.. Orton, 121 Idaho 709, 717, 827 P.2d 1160, 1168 (1992);

citing.Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho 292,298,442 P.2d 1178, 184 (1968).
The trial court. conclu,ded and Lamar argues inits brief that KEC might and should have
litigated its potential right to indemnity under the HVA, even though this right did not yet exist
because KEC's liability to Kuntz had not been fixed. Lamar is correct that the rule on permissive
cross-claims permits a party to assert that another defendant "is or may be'' liable to the crossclaimant for "all or part" ofa claim asserted by the plaintiff. (Resp. Br. at 33) IDAJIO R. CJV. P.

JJ(g). But that point misses the mark. It focuses only on whether a claim for a right that has yet
to and may never arise might be litigated, not whether it should have been litigated, or even
· whether it had to be litigated lest it be barred forever by res judicata. After all, that is the end
result of the Court's ruling and Lamar's argument, even though trhils on indemnity actions
following trials as to. liability for underlying wrongs are commonplace.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS § 22 cmt. i (2000) (Indemnity may normally be recovered in a third-party claim in the
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suit where the indemnitee is sued by the plaintiff or in a separate lawsuit.); and see STEIN
TREATISE§

14:56 (3d ed. 2007) (In most jurisdictions, a claim for indemnity may be asserted in

a separate action or by cross-claim or impleader.)
Lamar has criticizedKEC's .election to plead a cross-claim for apportionment in lieu of a
potential right to indemnity, even though IDAHO R. C1v. P.13(g) expressly permitted KBC to do
exactly what it .did. Lamar argues that in spite of the permissive nature of IDAHO R. CIV. P.
13(g), KBC should be barred from asserting its right to indemnity because it might have and

should have litigated this claim in the. Kuntz matter. Even though Idaho courts have not ruled
that indemnity claims must be brought in the underlying.tort action or addressed the application
of res judicata to crosscclaims,. Lamar's position was given the benefit of the doubt by Judge
Luster, who granted Lamar's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed KBC's claim of
statutory indemnity. KBC, on the other hand, has provided reasons why it should not have
litigated a claim that had yet to arise in the prior federal action (even assuming it might have
plead a claim for recovery under the HVA in the absence of a jury verdict affixing its liability to
Kuntz). Sid Richardson Carbon.& Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F .3d 746, 756 (5 th
Cir. 1996) ("It is axiomatic that a claim that has not yet accrued is not ripe for adjudication, and
hence it is not a claim that 'could have been litigated' in a previous lawsuit. Under such

i circumstances,

we cannot conclude that the instant claim for tax indemnity 'could have been

litigated' by Sid Richardson before the cause of action accrued in 1995, and thus we decline to
. hold that the instant claim is barred by res judicata.").
Judge Luster's ruling that res judicata bars KBC' s claim for statutory indemnity under
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the HVA should be reversed because (1) KEC did not plead and should not have pleaded a right
to statutory indemnity urtder the HVA in Kuntz; (2) KEC's right to statutory indemnity was made
manifest by the verdict in. Kuntz and payment therefore; (3) KEC's cross-claim for
apportionment was not a claim for statutory indemnity as Lamar suggests; and (4) KEC's
decision to pursue a claim for statutory indemnity in a separate action instead of by cross-claim
in the Kuntz action.is entirely consistent with common law and IDAHOR. C1v. P.13(g). County

of Riverside v. Loma .Linda. Univ., 173 Cal.Rptr. 371, 378 (1981) ("Nor does the fact that the
county failed to cross-cornplain[for indemnity] againstthe university in the medical malpractice
action preclude it from maintaining an independent action for indemnity.")
D.

RES JUD/c:'ATA .jS INAPPLICABLE TO KEC'S CLAIM FOR STATUTORY INDEMNIFICATION

BECAUSE THIS CLAIM WAS NOT ACTUALLY LITIGATED IN THE FEDERAL SUIT,

In addition to argµing that KEC might have and.should have litigated a claim that did not
exist in the Kuntz action, Lamar also argues that KEC actually did litigate its claim for statutory
indemnity -'- even though the same is a claim that did not arise until KEC' s liability to Kuntz was
fixed by verdict. 6 Not only.is this position nonsensical, it is patently false. Nonetheless, Lamar
repeats this mischatacterization of fact in numerous places in its brief. (Resp. Br. at 14, 19, 22,
26, 27)

6
Lamar niakes frequent mention of the fact that during a conference on jury instructions that transpired prior to the
jury's deliberations.and eventual verdict in the Kuntz action, counsel fot KEC agreed with the Court (and counsel for
Lamar) that no party had any indemnity claims against the other. (Resp. Br. at 8, 15) This puts Lamar in the most
peculiar position of arguing that KEC did, in fact, actually litigate a claim thatthe parties and the Court agreed it did
not have. Of course, it is obvious why Lamar represented to the court that it had no indemnity claim as there was
never a viable basis for its cross-claim for indemnity against KEC. !tis equally obvious why KEC, Lamar, and the
court agreed during this conference that KEC had no indemnity claim. To wit, KEC's liability to Kuntz had yet to
be fixed by ajury; and indeed, the prospect still existed that no liability running from KEC to Kuntz would be
affixed at all. In the absence of a verdict, KEC had no indemnity claim for damages to Kuntz.
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The Honorable Robert H. Whaley explicitly found that KEC did not assert a claim for
indemnification, much less litigate one.
I've looked through the record and find that there was no claim made
by you
of
. against Lamar in this court other than for apportionment
.
fault
[M]y research indicates that it would not be something we could do
[take up the issue ofKEC's right to indemnity l!llder the HVA] because
the claim was never made here.

(R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 367, L. 21-25 and p. 368, L. 1-8) It is axiomatic that the claim was never
litigated if it was never plead at all. Judge Luster confirms that KEC did not assert a right to
recovery under the HVA, stating "KEC did not specifically plead indemnification pursuant to

Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2). (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 850) The trial court also confirms the obvious,
noting "[t]he question of indemnification was not tried." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 850)
Lamar attempts to circumvent these. conclusions by arguing that: (1) KEC pleaded and
litigated its right to jndemnity under the HVA when it argued at sunnnary judgment that Lamar
violated the notice provision of the HVA and was liable to Kuntz as a result; (2) Judge Whaley
rejected KEC's right to indemnity during the hearing on KEC's motion to alter or amend the
· judgment; and (3) KEC's election not to appeal Judge Whaley's denial of the motion to alter or

i amend is res judicata as to KEC's right to statutory indemnity.

None of these arguments have

merit.
First, KEC did not argue any entitlement to relief, recovery, or indemnification for itself
when it argued on sunnnary judgment that Lamar had violated portions of the HV A requiring the
provision of notice to utilities; The record is abundantly clear in this regard. KEC did not use
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and could not use Idaho Code.§ 55-2404(2) to establish any liability running from Lamar to
KBC because (1) KBC had no substantive claims against Lamar for which Lamar could be liable,
and (2) KBC did not have any determination of liability as to the plaintiff Kuntz which would
permit the invocation of statutory indemnity against Lamar. Instead, KBC argued that Lamar's
violation of the HVA made Lamar liable to Kuntz because a statutory violation is negligence per

se. KBC also argued that Kuntz's violation of the HVA made him responsible for his own
damages in a percentage to be itllocated by the jury .because he was negligent per se. While both
of these arguments resulted iti summary judgment against Lamar and Kuntz, neither Lamar nor
Kuntz were thereby found liable to or responsible for the indemnification of KBC. Rather, the
summary judgment findings resulted in directed verdicts against both Lamar and Kuntz,
guaranteeing that each would.be allocated fault for the damages to Kuntz, irrespective of whether
the jury would reach a verdict against and allocate fault to KBC.
Second, and in spite of .Lamar's assertions, Judge Whaley did not "reject" KBC's
indemnity rights in denying KEC's motion to alter or amend thejudgment. (Resp. Br. at 12, 19,
22, 26, 27, 31) Rather, he declined to rule upon KBC's right to indemnity specifically because
i

KBC had.not pleaded it, stating "it's not before me unless I find somehow we can amend the
pleadings in a post-trial context; and I don't believe we can." (R. 33807, Vol. II, p. 370, L. 1315) The unambiguous language from the transcript of the hearing on KBC's motion establishes
that Judge Whaley denied relief on grounds that pleadings could not be amended after the
conclusion of the trial, and not because KBC had no viable right to indemnity from Lamar now
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that the jury had entered a verdict, in part, against KBC. 7
Lastly, if res judicata attaches to Judge Whaley's ruling on KEC's motion to alter or
amend the .judgment because it went unappealed, it attaches to the precise ruling, and not
Lamar's spin-doctoring of the same. In other words, res judicata in the form of issue preclusion
would bar a reexamination of whether pleadings can be .amended after a trial to include causes of
action which were never pleaded. The fact that KEC did not appeal the court's ruling in this
regard has no relationship whatsoever to KBC' s right to indemnity under the HVA.

E.

RES JUDICAT/1 DOES NOT APPLY 'I'O UNRIPE. OR PREMATURE INDEMNITY CLAIMS, AND
KEC'S CROSS-CLAIM FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM
WHICH MADE KECAND LAMAR ADVERSE FOR THE PURPOSES OF RES JUD/CATA,

In response to .KEC's demonstration that resjudicata generally does not apply to unripe
and premature indemnity claims,Lamar first posits thatJudge Whalley ruled that KEC was not
entitled to indemnity durinir the hearing on KEC's post-trial motion to alter or amend the
judgment. (Resp. Br. at 31) · As set forth previously, this is simply not true. Judge Whalley did
not deny a motion for indemnity or even rule upon KEC' s right thereto, but rather denied a
motion to alter or amend a jury verdict and permit the pleading of a newly arisen claim.
While KEC's request to assert a new claim may have come too late (after the entry of a
verdict), it is well-established that KEC's right to statutoryindemnity was premature and did not
, arise until KEC's liability to Kuntz was fixed by the verdict and payment therefore was
7

Lamar has already set forth the language from Judge Whaley where he opined that KEC could have pleaded a
, claim for relief under the HVA,· even though he could not say if such a claim would be compulsory. ("Whether it
' was a compulsory counterclaim or whatever, I'm not addressing." (R. 33807,Vol. II, p. 370, L. 6-7) Judge Whaley
· offered no opinions as to whether KEC should have pleaded a right to indemnity in advance of a verdict giving rise
, to the same. It is also significant that Judge Whaley understood that KEC's election not to plead a right that had yet
i to arise would have no bearing on KEC's ability to assert this right in a subsequent action in Idaho state court.

'
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delivered. County of Riverside, Cal. Rptr. at 378 ("A cause of action for indemnity does not
accrue or come into existence until the indemnitee has suffered actual loss for which he is
entitled to indemnity, either through payment of

a court judgment or through settlement.");

Israel v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Iowa, 339 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1983) ("Israel's claim

for indemnity did not accrue until judgment was entered against him ... There having been no
asserted or required indemnity crossclaim in the first lawsuit, there was no prior adjudication of
such a claim and no preclusion of the Israel claim for indemnity against FMI. ") (internal citations
omitted); Sid Richr,rdson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 99 F.Jd at 756 ("It is axiomatic that a claim
that has not yet accrued is not rip\: for adjudication,. and hence it is not a claim that 'could have
been litigated' in a previous lawsuit. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
i

instant claim for tax indemnity 'could have been litigated' by Sid Richardson before the cause of
action accrued in 1995, and thus we decline to hold that the instant claim is barred by res
judicata."); Beitzel v. Orton, 121 Idaho 709, 717, 827 P.2d 1160, 1168 (1992); Williams v.
Johnston, 92 Idaho 292,298, 442 P.2d 1178, 184 (1968); Borchard v. Wefco, Inc., 112 Idaho

555, 733 P.2d 776 (1987); Schiess v. Bates, 107 Idaho 794, 693 P.2d 440 (1984); and May
Trucking Co. v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319,543 P.2d 1159 (1975). Because KEC's right

to indemnity was premature and unripe in the Kuntz action, it is not subject to res judicata in this
suit in accordance with the holding of Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751,754,663
P.2d 287,290 (1983), rehearing denied.
Lamar attempts to evade the applicability of Duthie by arguing that no facts occurred
subsequent to the Kuntz trial that triggered the filing of the instant lawsuit in Idaho state court.
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(Resp. Br. at 32) This is false. After the Kuntz verdict, KEC paid ajudgment in the amount of
$9,965,752.00 to Kuntz. (R.33807, Vol. I, p. 5-7; R.30808,Vol. I, p. 6-12) This fact gave rise
to a ripe and mature claim for statutory indemnity under the HVA, and triggered the filing of the
current action.

Lamar, however, argues that both suits were triggered by "KEC's reckless

misconduct." (Resp; .Br. at 33) But KEC's misconduct did. not trigger the instant lawsuit KEC's payment of ajudgme11fto Kuntz did.
Lamar also argues that.KEC's unripe claim for indemnity became a compulsory claim
once KEC pleada cross~claimfor apportionment. Lamar apparently urges this Court to find that
apportionment claims ar\l substantive claims that automatically make parties adverse to one
another. First, cross-claims are never compulsory under the plain language of IDAHO R. CIV. P.
13(g) or FED. R. C1v. P. 13(g). Second, a claim for apportionment (much like a claim for

contribution or indemnity) is not a substantive. cross-claim that makes parties adverse. Hemme

v. Bharti, 183. S.W.3d 593, 596.{Mo. 2006); Hall 11. Genera/Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175, 184
' (D.C. Cir. 1980): Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 146, n.11 (3 rd Cir. 1999);

Kirkcaldy v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 212 F.R.D. 289, 297-98 (M.D. N.C. 2002); Kane

v. Magna Mixer Co,, 71 F.3d 555, 561-62 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1220, I 16 S. Ct.
I 848, 134 L.Ed.2d 949 (1996)\ and Rainbow Mgmt. Group, Ltd. v. Atlantis Submarines
Hawaii, L.P., 158 F.R.D. 656,660 (D. Haw. 1994). Third, Lamar calls into question whether a
request for apportionment is .really a claim at all, much less a substantive cross-claim that makes
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parties adverse, because litigants are automatically entitled to an apportionment of fault. 8 (Resp.
Br. at 24) Lastly, even if KEC and Lamar were adversaries by virtue of KEC's cross-claim for
apportionment, res judicata would apply "only to .those claims that were actually asserted
through cross pleadings.'' Krikava v. Webber, 43 Wn. App. 217, 221, 716 P.2d 916, 919, review

denied, 106 Wn.2d 1010 {1986) (emphasis added). In other words, resjudicata would apply to
KEC's cross-claim for apportionment (the only cross-claim actually asserted), but not its
completely separate action for statµtory indemnity under the HVA. 9

F.

ISSUE

PRECLUSION

IS

INAPPLICABLE

TO

KEC's

CLAIM

FOR

STATUTORY

INDEMNIFICATION BECAUSE KEC'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF DOES NOT SEEK OR REQUIRE
RELITIGATION OF THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT OR THE MEASURE OF
DAMAGES TO THIRD PERSONS UNDER IDAHO CODE § 55-2404(2).

Throughout its brief, L,arnar continuously refers to KEC's claim for statutory indemnity

as an attempt to reallocate fault or shift the apportionment of fault from the Kuntz matter, as if
the very concept of indemnification is foreign to Lamar. (See Resp. Br. at 9, 26, 27, 30, 39, 42,
43) KEC has never requested thatthe court change the percentage fault allocated by the jury to
each party in the Kuntz action, nor is KEC's assertion of a newly arisen right to statutory
indemnity some sort of covert effort by KEC to reallocate fault. With respect to KEC' s right to
8

In claiming that adversity is a fact specific detennination and that the parties were "clearly adverse," Lamar refers
: to KEC's argument at summary judgment that Lamar violated the .HVA. (Resp. Br. at 35) This is irrelevant as
' KEC's cross-claim was for apportionment, and was not based npon an allegation that Lamar violated the HVA. It is
' also misleading since KEC's argµment at summary judgment was that Lamar's violation of the HVA was the basis
\ for Lamar's liability to Kuntz:
'

~

9

Lamar's attempt to distinguish the instant case from the Krikavli decision is unavailing. Lamar attaches a curious
: significance to the fact that the Krikava cross-claims for contribution and indemnity were not litigated to conclusion
: because the initial lawsuit settled. This argument misses the point. As the direct quote from the opinion indicates,
: the issue is whether the claims that were asserted made the parties adversaries. The assertion of derivative claims
, for contribution, indemnity, and apportionment do not make parties adversaries such that cross-claims become
i compulsory.
·

29

statutory indemnity under the HVA, it simply does not matter what. percentage of fault the jnry
affixed to KEC for .its liability to Kuntz because KBC is entitled to have all of the damages it
paid to Kuntz paid to it by Lamar by virtue of Lamar's violation of the notice requirements of the
HVA. Idaho Code§ 55~2404(2) plainly and unambiguously indicates as much. Lamar's entire
argument based upon the doctrine of issue preclusion and Blome v. Truska, 130 Idaho 669, 946
P.2d 631 (1997) is misleading and unavailing.
G.

THE COMPARATIVE FAULT/CONTRIBUTION STATUTES Do NOT APPLY BECAUSE
KEC's CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY UNDER THE HIGH VOLTAGE ACT Is STRICTLY
PREMISED ON LAMAR'S STATUTORY VIOLATION, NOT COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE.

It is profoundly disingenuous, .if not absurd; for Lamar to propose that basic tort
principles of comparative fault or contribution govern an analysis of Lamar's statutory violation
of the HVA.

Inexplicably and incorrectly, Lamar states .that KEC repeatedly applies basic tort

principles to its statutoryindemnity claim, with citations to KEC's opening brief. (Resp. Br. at
41) However, Lamar is flat-out wrong and citations to KEC' s brief are confusingly incorrect.
KEC's cross claim against Lamar for apportionment was premised on Lamar's
negligence and liability to Kuntz.

Accordingly, Judge Whaley directed the jnry to enter

judgment against Lamar for its liability to Kuntz. In the case at bar, KEC filed suit against
Lamar for· statutory indemnification, not common law negligence or "common law" indemnity.
Accordingly, the comparative negligence and contribution statutes do not come into play. Rather,
the rules of statutory interpretation govern the analysis.
KEC has a plain and unambiguous right to full statutory . indemnification resulting
directly from Lamar's statutory violation. Indeed, Judge Luster wholly rejected applying the
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comparative fault scheme to a violation of the HVA, stating that "[t]here is no question that the
comparative analysis that was done by the federal court simply does not come into play when
this court applies the High Voltage Act and the indemnity provisions." (Tr. 88:18-21) (emphasis
added)
Tellingly, Lamar, who bears the burden of proof in its cross appeal, cites no case from
Idaho or any other jurisdiction supporting its novel assertion that the comparative fault analysis
"comes into play" when a. court applies the High Voltage Act and its indemnity provisions.
There are no such cases. The few states that apply the comparative fault analysis are the states
that expressly include the scheme in their High Voltage Act, which the Idaho Legislature
declined to do.

H.

THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CONTROL LAMAR'S CROSS APPEAL ON
THE APPLICABILITY OF COMPARATIVE FAULT/CONTRIBUTION TO KEC'S RIGHT TO
STATUTORY INDEMNITY UNDER THE HIGH VOLTAGE ACT,

Lamar's cross appeal . first raises a question of pure statutory interpretation of the High
Voltage Act. "The determination of the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of
law[.]" Woodburn v. Manco Prods.,/nc., 137 Idaho 502, 504,.50 P.3d 997 (2002). As Judge

! Luster acknowledged, the primary function of the court in interpreting a statute is to determine
legislative intent and give effect to it. (R. 30808, Vol. III, p. 519); George W. Watkins Family v.

:, Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). Accordingly, the court may examine the
[ language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the
• statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000); Kootenai

\ Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432,901 P.2d 1333 (1995).
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The interpretation begins with the Ilteral words of the statute. Those words must be given
their plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d
1213 (1999). Judge Luster pointed out that "[w]here the statute is unambiguous. it speaks for
itself; it must be given the interpretation that the language clearly implies and without employing
rules of statutory .construction. The court is confined to that meaning and cannot add or take
away by judicial construction." (R. 30808, Vol. III, p. 519) State v. Hagerman Water Right
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997); Cameron v. Minidonka County Highway
Dist., 125 Idaho 801,.874 P.2d 1108 (1994); Credit Bureau of Lewiston-Clarkston, Inc. v.

Idaho First Nat'IBank, 117 Idaho 29, 784 P.2d 885 (1989).
Under Idaho's rules of construction, a statute is ambiguous where the language is capable
of more than one interpretation or where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its
meaning. Struhs v. Prot. Tech., .Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164 (1999). Significantly,
however, ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing interpretations
• to the court. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'r, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477
i (1999).

If the statute is ambiguous, then the court goes outside the language of the statute to

ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent and applies rules of construction.

Frazier v.

Neilsen & Co., 188 Idaho 104,794 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App.1990).

I.

APPLYING THE LANGUAGE OF THE HIGH VOLTAGE ACT TO KEC AND LAMAR PLAINLY
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE COMPARATIVE FAULT/CONTRIBUTION SCHEME "DOES
NOT COME INTO PLAY,"

1.

LAMAR'S STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY Is UNAMBIGUOUS

Interpreting the High Voltage Act according to its clear and plain language, J.C. § 55-
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2403 first addresses. Lamar's statutory responsibility:
If any contractor desires to temporarily carry .on any function, activity,
work or operation in closer proximity to any hi&sh voltage overhead line than
permitted in this .chapter, or in such proximity that the function, activity, work or
operation could possibly come within closer pvdximity than permitted in this
chapter, the contractor responsible for performing the work shall promptly notify
the public utility owning or operating the high voltage overhead line. The
contractor may perform the work only after making mutually agreeable
arrangements with the public utility owning or operating the line.
LC. § 55-2403 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that contractor Lamar failed to notify utility owner and operator KEC that
work would be performed around its high voltage overhead line.

Significantly, the Idaho

Legislature states that it.is the contractor's responsibility-not the utility's-.to notify the utility
that work will be performed around the. lines. However, in derogation of the plain language of
this statute, Lamar asserts that itwas KEC's responsibility to alert Lamar that it had reconfigured
its Bayview/Chilco line (as. if a failure to do so would negate recovery under the HVA). The
clear and unambiguous language of LC. § 55-2403 simply does. not impose such a responsibility
on KEC. Lamar violated the. High Voltage Act and is responsible.for KEC' s damages.
2.

LAMAR, NOT KEC, BEARS THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING THE HIGH
VOLTAGE ACT BECAUSE LAMAR FAILED TO NOTIFY KEC.

Violating the High Voltage Act has consequences pursuant to LC. 55-2404(2), which
addresses "a violation of the provisions of this chapter." It is undisputed that Lamar violated the
provisions of the HVA by .failing to notify KEC, as expressly and unequivocally required by the
Idaho HVA. However, to be actionable, the violation must be one that "results in physical or
electrical contact with any high voltage overhead line." J.C. § 55-2404(2) It is undisputed that
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Lamar's failure to notify KEC resulted in Kuntz making the requisite contact with the line. ·

3.

THE CONTRACTOR COMMITTING THE STATUTORY VIOLATION IS LIABLE TO
THE UTILITY FOR ALL DAMAGES INCURRED BY THE UTILITY As A RESULT OF
THE PHYS.ICAL OR ELECTRICAL CONTACT• .

I. C. § 55-2404(2) plainly states that the contractor "shall be Hable to the public utility
owning or operating the high voltage overhead line for all damages ... incurred by the public
utility as a result of the. contact" (emphasis added). KEC is the public utility that owned or
operated the high voltage overhead line near the board at Athol. Thus, Lamar is liable for all

damages that KEC incurred-.including damages to third persons that resulted from a person
making physical or electrical contact.
The Idaho Legislature obviously took statutory violations seriously when it enacted such
a significant penalty over 15 years ago.

Now, Lamar seeks to avoid the consequences of

violating a statute by contending that Idaho's negligence-based comparative fault or contribution
statutes somehow trumps, conflicts with, ot eviscerates the High Voltage Act. In contrast to
Idaho, a few state legislatures expressly include verbiage of comparative fault with respect to the
utility company in its High Voltage Act. For example, Judge Luster noted that "Alaska left in
place considerations of comparative fault with respect to the. utility company. Arizona's Act,
which of course is much more identical to Idaho's, did not" take it into account. (Tr. 89:5-7
(emphasis added)) Judge Luster ruled the HVA does not contain a comparative fault component,
and this omission was "clearly the intent of the Idaho statute." (Tr. 89:10-11)
Unlike High Voltage Acts in other states, Idaho's statute, LC. § 55-2404(2), by its plain
and unambiguous terms, does not carve out exceptions, restrictions, or qualifiers for acts or
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omissions of a public utility, nor does Lamar point to any. Other state legislatures (such as
Alaska's provision at Alaska Stat. § 18.60.685(h)), !Oadd comparative fault language its High
Voltage Act. Idaho does not. This Court should decline Lamar's invitation to act as a super
legislature and add language to the High Voltage Act.
J.

GUIDANCE. FROM QTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE ENACTED AN HVA VIRTUALLY
IDENTICAL TO IDAHO'S HVA, SUCH AS ARI:Z:ONA,JS USEFUL.

Lamar's cross appeal fails to cite a single case to support its assertion that tort-based
comparative fault statutes apply to Idaho's High Voltage Act. Rather, Lamar recites Idaho's
comparative fault .and contribution statutes and simply asserts .that the statutes should apply
because it "does no violence" to the HVA.

Lamar's assertion has no merit.

It is not

substantiated with supportive cases from Idaho or any state that has enacted an HVA similar to
Idaho's HVA.
Fortunately, decisions in other jurisdictions provide gUidance with respect to applying a
comparative fault analysis to the High Voltage Act. Approximately 32 of the 50 states have
enacted a HVA. Arizona, for example, has an Ac5 that is virtually identical to Idaho's Act. 11

10

Alaska Stat § 18.60.685(h) provides as follows: "If a violation of AS 18.60.670 - 18.60.695 results in physical or
electrical contact with an overhead high voltage line or conductor, the violator is liable to the owner or operator of
the high voltage line or condoctor for all damage to the facilities aod for all liability incurred by the owner or
operator as a result of the unlawful activities. (emphasis added). The Alaska statute qualifies the indemnification
"for all liability" by restricting it to liability incurred as a result of "unlawful activities." The Alaska statute invokes
a comparative fault scheme by distinguishing between the violator's negligence and the utility's unlawful
negligence. See Atwaterv. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 727 P.2d 774 (1986).
li In Wyoming, the Legislature expressly stated that the Wyoming HVA was modeled after the Arizona HV A and
that Arizona case law interpreting the statutes should be used in interpreting the Wyoming statutes. The Wyoming
Legislature found as follows:

The legislature finds that W.S. 37-3-301 through 37-3-306 are modeled from the Arizona
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Accordingly, Arizona cases provide useful guidance for interpreting Idaho's High Voltage Act.
The Arizona statute provides as follows: ·
Arizona's Statute

ff a violation of this article results in physical or electrical contact with any high
voltage line, the person or business entity violating the article is liable to the
public utility operating the high voltage overhead line for all damages to the
facilities and· all costs and expenses,• including damages to third persons, incurred
by the public utility as a result of the contact.
·
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 40>360-44(B) (emphasis added).
Idaho's Statute

If a violation of the provisions of this chapter results in physical or electrical
contact with any high voltage overhead line, the contractor committing the
violation .shall be liable to the public utility owning; or operating the high voltage
overhead line for all damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses,
including damages to thitd persons, incurred by the public utility as a result of the
contact.
J.C.§ 55-2404(2) (emphasis added).

In Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. Swengel-Robbins Constr. Co., 153 Ariz. 486, 737 P.2d
1385 (Ariz. App. 1987), an electric company brought a third-party action seeking
Overhead Powerline Safety Law, Chapter 2, Article 6.4 ARS 40-360.41-45 (1980), and that
Arizona case law interpreting the Arizona statutes should be used in interpreting the corresponding
Wyoming statutes.

W. S. 1977 § 37-3-301; Hyo. Stat Ann. § 37-3-301 (emphasis added). Wyoming's HVA is virtually
·
identical to Idaho's HVA. It states as follows:
Wyoming's HVA
If a violation of this act results in physical or electrical contact with any high voltage overhead
line, the person or business entity violating this act is liable to the public utility for all damages to
the facilities artd all costs and expenses, including damages to third parties, incurred by the public
utility as a result of the contact.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-3-305 (emphasis added).
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indemnification from a c.onstruction company with respect to a claim against it by the widow of
an electrocuted worker. Summary judgment was e.ntered in favor of the electric company on the
HVA indemnity cJaim. The .appellate court discussed its holding and rationale as follows:
The. statute represents a determination by the legislature that where work
is being performed near power lines, the person or entity performing the work is
in the best position to prevent injury - whether caused .by its negligence or that of
the utility - by giving notice so that appropriate protective measures may be
taken. The)mposition. of liability for what is in effect Swengel-Robbins' own
negligence in failing to give notice and thereby enabling TEP to take action to
prevent injury is,a reasonable legislative choice .... Had [Swengel-Robbin]
given the required notice and had TEP failed to take appropriate protective
measures, no liability would have ensued· and no obligation to indemnify would
have arisen. Conversely, had notice been given and protective measures been
taken, no injury would have occurred. Swengel-Robbins was not prevented by
the statute. from protecting itself. Given the unexcused violation of the statutes,
we hold that the statutorylanguage permitting recovery for 'all damages ... to
third persons,· incurred by the utility' allows indemnification for the utility's
·
own negligence.··
Id. at 1387 (emphasis added; citations omitted). Similarly, in Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. DooleyJones and Assoc., 155 Ariz. 340, 746 P.2d 510 (Ariz. App. 1987), the appellate court held that
the power company was entitled to indemnification against an injured surveyor's employer for
damages due to surveyor who. was injured when his equipment came into contact with the power
line, even though the power lines were under the minimum height as defined by the National
Electric Safety Code. The employer failure to notify the power company that work was to be
performed within six feet of overhead line, which was in contravention of the High Voltage
Power Lines and Safety Restrictions Act. Id. at 512-13.
The Arizona appellate court held that pursuant to the High Voltage Power Lines and
Safety Restrictions Act, a business which violates the statutory safety requirement must
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indemnify the utility company, even for the utility's own negligence. Id. at 514. Significantly,
the Arizona trial court did not rely on the common law doctrine of indemnity in granting
! '

summary judgment to the utility company, but relied solely on the statutes. "When a claim for
indemnity is based on Ii. statutory right, it is the statute that determines the effect of the
indemnitee's own negligence." Id. In affirming its holding in Swengel-Robbins Constr., the
appellate court noted that the Arizona Legislature intended that utilities be indemnified even if
they were also negligent. DoQley-Jones and Assoc., 746 P.2d at 514.
Similarly in TucsQnElec. Power Co. v. Kokosing Constr. Co., 159 Ariz. 317, 767 P.2d
40, 43 (Ariz. App.1988), Kokosing Construction argued that common law rules of indemnity
should apply where there is a question of an utility's own independent negligence. Noting that
Kokosing Construction's argument had been twice rejected, the Court·of Appeals again affirmed
its holding in Swengel-Robbins Constr., wherein the Court "held that a business which violates
the notice requirement of the statute must indemnify the utility even for the utility's own
negligence." Kokosing Constr., 767 P.2d at 43. The Court of Appeals also affirmed its holding
in Dooley-Jones and Assoc. wherein the Court "held that when a claim for indemnity is based on
a statutory right, as it is here, the statute, and not the common law, determines the effect of the
indemnitee's own negligence." Kokosing Constr., 767 P.2d at 43.
Significantly, the Court in Kokosing Constr. acknowledged that in adopting the High
Voltage Act, the Arizona Legislature ''placed the primary responsibility for safety upon the
persons or businesses actually performing work in close proximity to power lines." Id. at 42. The
Court held as follows:
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A person or business desiring to work within six feet of a high voltage overhead
line must promptly notify the utility operating the line before work begins so that
precautionary measures may be taken. If the utility fails to receive such notice, it
may seek indemnity from the party performing the work for "all costs and
expenses, including damages to. third persons,. incurred by the public utility as a
resultofthe contact."
Id. (citations omitted). Arizona's appellate court holdings in these three cases are instructive as

Idaho navigates its way through interpreting Idaho's HVA, which is virtually identical to
Arizona's HVA.

v. Arizona Pub.
Serv. Co., 202 Ariz. 388, 46
Inexplicably, Lamar solely cites Gunnell
.
.
P.3d 399 (Ariz . .2002) in support of its assertion that comparative fault statutes come into play
with statutory indemnity. (Resp. Br.. at 42) However, this case is. completely inapposite because

Gunnell addressed and applied the Underground Facilities Act (A.R.S. §§ 40-30-.21 to 40360.32), not the High Voltage Act (A.R.S. §§ 40-360.41. to 40-360.45). They are tota:Jly different
statutes, and Lamar's reliance on Gunnell is misplaced.

Unlike Arizona's HVA, its

Underground Facilities. Act imposes statutory .duties upon the contracting excavator and the
public utility. In Gunnell, both the contractor and the utility violated the Underground Facilities
Act. The contractor fail¢d to notify the utility when he discovered an unmarked, unidentified
steel pipe and the utility failed to originally identify the pipe. Id. at 391-92. Thus, when reading
two sections of the. same statute together with fault applied proportionately in each statute, and
acknowledging that the Underground Facilities Act was enacted before Arizona's Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the Court held that the UCATA applied. Id. at 396.
The Arizona Supreme Court distinguished Gunnell from Tucson Elec. Power Co. v.
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Swengel-Robbins Constr. Co.,. stating that under Arizona's HVA, "the legislature intended to
transfer all responsibility for a worker's personal injuries from the negligent owner of the lines to
the negligent contractor working near the lines." Gunnell, 46 P.3d at 393.

Moreover, the

excavating contractor was also the "third person." In the case at bar, Lamar is not both the
contractor and third person for purposes of determining indemnification. Likewise, Judge Luster
distinguished Gunnell from Swengel-Robbins and ruled that Gunnell was inapplicable. (R.
30808, Vol. III, p. 521 n.5; R. 30808, Vol. III, p. 527 n. 8)
Arizona's and Wyoming's HVA (among others) are virtually identical to Idaho's HVA.
In sum, Arizona's case law provides the Court with ample guidance that the comparative fault
scheme does not come into play when interpreting the HVA and statutory indemnification.

K.

THE HVA Is N:OT IN PAR/ MATER/A WITH THE COMPARATIVE FAULT AND
CONTRIBUTION STATUTES;

In interpreting statutes, a Court is governed by the rule that statutes which relate to the
same subject matter, .or are "in pari materia," must be construed together. Matter ofAdoption of

Chaney, 126 Idaho. 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1995). However, the statutes in question here are not in

pari materia. Under the rules of statutory construction, statutes are in pari materia only if they
relate to the same subject. 12 Grand Canyon DorifSY, Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho I,
855 P.2d 462 (1993).
Notably, the High Voltage Act governs activities near high voltage overhead lines and
12

For example, all statutes govetnjng disposition of community property in divorce cases are in pari materia. Jones
v. State, 85 Idaho 135, 376 P2d 361 (1962); statutes governing rights to a materialman's lien, as well as the land
subject to such lien must be. construed in pari materia. Chief Indus. Inc. v. Schwend/man, 99 Idaho 682, 587 P.2d
823 (1978); and all statutes relating to the appointment of a guardian for a minor must be read and applied together
in pari materia. Matter of Guardianship ofDiamond, 109 Idaho 409, 707 P.2d 520 (Ct. App. 1985).
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provides statutory remedies to the utility company when a contractor commits a statutory
violation. In contrast, the comparative fault/contribution statutes govern negligence claims and
provide for an allocation among joint tortfeasors. KEC did not file a negligence claim against
Lamar. KEC is a utility company that incurred monetary damages resulting directly from
Lamar's statutory violation. KEC's claim is one for statutory indemnity.

L.

EVEN IF THE STATOTES ARE IN PARI MATERJA, THEN THEY MUST BE CONSTRUED
TOGETHER TO EFFECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

Lamar's unsubstantiated construction of Idaho's HVA basically eviscerates its meaning
andpurpose. If the HVA and the comparative fault statutes are in pari materia, then they must be
construed together to give legislative effect.

Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 124 Idaho l, 855 P.2d 462 (1993). Lamar fails to acknowledge, much less dissect the

HVA's intent. When Neil Colwell presented the HVA House Bill to the Senate Local
Government and Taxation Committee. He stated as follows:
[T]he .bill deals with overhead electrical safety. It is intended to protect
contractorsfrom coming into contact with electric lines. It sets parameters of
what they should do .to ·a.void possible hazards. Contractors are to contact
electrical utilities before working within specified distances ofpower lines.

Senate Local Gov 't and Taxation, H. 751, at 1 (1992). Moreover, the Idaho Legislature provides
a "Statement of Purpose" in House Bill 751 as follows:
Statement of Purpose: "This act is intended to.enhance the safety of people who
contract .to work in the vicinity of high voltage electric power lines. It would
require contractors to make safety arrangements with electrical utilities before
working within specified distances of power lines."
·

Idaho House Statement of Purpose (H.B. 751, 1992 Leg., 51 st Sess. (Idaho 1992)) Finally, the
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title of the HVA is instructive. The Act is titled as follows:
An act relating to activities in proximity to high voltage overhead lines; amending
title 55, Idaho Code, by the add.ition thereto of a new chapter 24, title 55, Idaho
Code, to provide .definitions; to prohibit activities in. proximity to high voltage
overhead Il11es except within specified cl~arances; . to provide for
arrangements with. public utilities for the performance of activities in closer
proximity that the specified clearances; to provide penalties and payment of
damages .for violations of the provisions
the chapter; and to provide
exemptions.

of

Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 177, p. 559 (emphasis .added). The sound and logical policy of
promoting public safety is fulfilled when the contractor, not the utility company, notifies and
makes arrangements with. the utility before it performs work around the utility's lines.

A

contractor's failure to do so invokes the Act's clear intent to "provide penalties and payment of
damages for violations of the. provisions of this chapter."
Lamar. admits it violated the HVA, and the Legislature was clear that it intended for a
contractor such as Lamar to pay damages. The HVA does not contain an allocation scheme. The
violation and resulting penalty is squarely on the contractor, which is the Legislature's express
intent. Applying a tort-based comparative fault scheme would abort the Idaho Legislature's
express intent.
M.

WHEN Two STATUTES APPEAR TO APPLY TO THE SAME CASE OR SUBJECT
MATTER, THE SPECIFIC STATUTE WILL CONTROL OVER THE GENERAL STATUTE,

If the Court determines. that the comparative fault scheme and the HVA are the same
subject matter,. then KEG submits that the HVA controls because it is a specific statute governing
activities that occur in close proximity to a utility's high voltage overhead lines, and providing
remedies for a contractor's statutory violation, including indemnification. Gooding County v.
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Wybenga, 13 7 Idaho 201, 204, 46 P .3d 18 (2002).

The HVA specifically instructs a contractor not to perfonn any function or activity upon
any land, building, highway, waterway or other premises within specific clearances of high
voltage overhead lines (J.C. § 55-2402); if any contractor ''desires to temporarily carry on any
function, activity, work or operation in closer proximity to any high voltage overhead line" then
the contractor responsible for perfonning the work shall notify the utility company, and may
only perfonn the work after making mutually agreeable arrangements with the utility company to
place temporary barriers to prevent electrical contact; temporary deenergization; or temporary
relocation or raising of the lines. (LC. § 55-2403). If a contractor violates the HVA and the
violation results in physical or electricalcontact with the high voltage overhead lines, then the
contractor is liable to the utility company for all damages, including damages to third persons
incurred by the utility as a result of the contact. (LC. § 55-2404). In sum, a contractor must
indemnify a utility company for its damages when it violates the HVA. KEC's claim against
Lamar is strictly for statutory indemnification, not common law negligence.
In contrast, the comparative fault/contribution statutes allocate recovery for negligence
claims in general. The comparative negligence statute covers any action in which plaintiff is
seeking to recover on grounds of negligence. Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369
(1985). KEC is not seeking recovery on grounds of a common law tort or negligence-it is
seeking reimbursement for damages it incurred as a direct result of Lamar's statutory violation,
so the comparative fault statutes do not even come into play. Even if the comparative negligence
statutes had any application in this case, the more specific HVA would control.
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N.

IF THERE IS AN IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCY AMONG STATUTES IN PARI
MATERIA, THEN THE LATEST EXPRESSION OF THE "LEGISL~TIVE WILL" SHOULD
CONTROL.

The HVA is 1;he latest expression of Legislative will because it was enacted in 1992 and
amended in 2000. In contrast, the contributory fault/contribution statutes were enacted in 1971
and amended in 1987. Accordingly, the latest expression of Legislative will should control. See

Employment Sec. Agency v. Joint Class ''A" School Dist., 88 Idaho 384, 400 P.2d 377 (1965);
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bd. ofTaxAppeals, 103 Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982); Grand Canyon
Dories v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 124 Idaho 1, 8~5 P.2d 462 (1993). Idaho adopted the
comparative fault tort reform. in 1971 and amended it in 1987. With this in mind, the Legislature
in 1992 could have included a .comparative fault scheme in its HVA, like other states. Instead,
the Legislature established responsibilities for the contractor who is performing activities in close
proximity to the overhead lines. Protecting the safety of.contractors is the Legislature's express
intent, and when a contractor ducks its responsibility and a person is electrocuted, then the
Legislative will imposes harsh penalties for violating the Act.

0.

THE RULES .OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
INDEMNIFICATION SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT KEC's CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION WAS FILED WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

As a preliminary. matter, Lamar asserts that miscellaneous costs and expenses that KEC
incurred during the Kuntz accident investigation or for attorney fees incurred in the underlying
action triggers the statute of!imitations. (Resp. Br. at 45) This assertion is unpersuasive because
KEC waived its claimfor these costs and.fees and Lamar did not object. (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p.
858) Accordingly, Lamar's statute of limitations defense is moot because KEC waived its right
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for reimbursement of miscellaneous costs and fees, and Lamar had no objection to this waiver.
(See R. 33807, Vol. IV, p.858, wherein Judge Luster states that "the record reflects that KEC has

waived the claim and Lamar does not object." Judge Luster ruled that "[i]n sum, any claim for
expenses and attorneys' fees, incurred in both the prior fedend district court case and the instant
case, has been waived.")
Notwithstanding this waiver, Lamar's·argumentthatKEC's claim for statutory indemnity
accrued as soon as KEC started paying attorney's fees was soundly rejected by the Texas
Supreme Court in Ingersol-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203 (Texas 1999).
There, the Court relied on the general rule that. an indemnification cause of action does not
accrue "until all of the potential Jiab,ilities of the indemnitee become fixed and certain." Id. at
210.

The fact that attorneys' fees were incurred earlier did not trigger the accrual of the

indemnification cause of action. The Texas Supreme Court held that "[w]hile attorney's fees
will almost always be a component of an indemnitee's total liabilities, we decline to hold that
recovery for the attorney's fees component of an indemnitee's potential liability must be pursued
, before and separate from the remaining components." Id.
Judge Luster pointed out that "certain principles from indemnification law, as a practical
matter, must apply to a case arising under a statute." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 847) He stated that
"under the common law rule, a cause of action for indemnification does not accrue until damages
' . have been awarded against the party seeking indemnification.

Indemnification actions are

separate from the underlying wrong." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 847)
This Supreme Court has held that "unless liability of the claimed indemnitee to the third
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party is established, the right to indemnification does not arise." Beitzel v. Orton, 121 Idaho 709,
717, 827 P.2d 1160, .1168 (1992) see also Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho 292, 298, 442 P.2d
178, 184 (1968) (same). Judge Luster also. applied rules of statutory interpretation and logic,
ruling that "[a]ceordirtg to Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2), the contractor is 'liable' for all costs and
expenses, including damages to third persons, incurred by the public utility as a result of the
contact." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 848) Judge Luster reasoned that the "costs and expenses incurred
by the public utility as a result of the contact are not established untH some kind ofjudgment is
entered or. resolution is reached against the public utility, especially where damages to third
parties are involved." (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 848) (emphasis added). Judge Luster concluded that
"the cause of action based upon Idaho Code § 55-2404(2) accrued when the jury returned a
verdict in the federal court lawsuit and the judgment was entered against KEC on October 29,
2002." (R. 33807, VoL IV, p. 848)
When applying the statute of limitations to an indemnity claim, the law in Idaho, as well
as virtually every other jurisdiction in the United States, is that KEC's separate cause of action
against Lamar for indemnity did not accrue until the Court formally entered Judgment in favor of
James Kuntz and against KEC, which obligated KEC to pay damages to a third person. The trial
court acknowledged that KEC's claim for relief was timely commenced within two months of
the October 2002 Judgment. (R. 33807, Vol. IV, p. 848)
Relying on Beitzel, the trial court ruled that "KEC's right to indemnification under Idaho
Code § 5-2404(2) did not arise until its liability was established in the underlying case." (R.
30808, Vol. III, p. 532} KEC had no final .claim upon which to sue Lamar for "indemnification"
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until KBC incurred "damages to third persons." Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2). No "damages to third
persons" were incurred. by KEC until the jury verdict was returned and Judgment entered in the
underlying action.
The Jury returned its verdict on October 18, 2002, and Judgment was entered on or about
October 29, 2002. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for KBC's indemnification claim began
to run on or about October 29, 2002. KBC filed suit against Lamar for indemnification on
December 30, 2002, welLwithin the statute of limitations.
Lamar asserts that .KBC's claim for indemnification "accrued the moment that some of
the costs and expenses had been incurred." (Resp. Br. at 46) Specifically, Lamar alleges that
KEC's claim for indemnification accrued on December 22, 1998, when KEC employees traveled
to the scene of the accident to inspect the area, thereby expending gas money and incurring "an

!

expense." As such, KBC incurred "immediate damage" for its costs and expenses, so Lamar
posits that KBC's claim for indemnification arose on December 22, 1998.

Under Lamar's

"immediate damage" theory, KBC was required to file suit within three years, or before
1

December 22, 2001. Lamar argues that KBC's failure to file its claim until after Judgment was
entered in October 2002 bars the indemnification claim.
KEC certainly incurred miscellaneous costs and expenses in the underlying suit (which it
waived), but "damages to third persons" (James. Kuntz) as delineated in Idaho Code § 55-

2404(2), incurred by KEC did not accrue until the jury issued a verdict, and Judgment was
' entered. In effect, the Judgment entered on October 29, 2002 was the last instance of KEC's
damages that triggered the beginning of statute of limitations for its indemnity claim.
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Lamar's "itnillediate damage" theory totally ignores the fact that damages to third
persons, such as plaintiff James Kuntz in the underlying suit, were unknown until October 18,
2002, when the jury reached a verdict. Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2) states as follows:
(2) If a violation of the provisions of this chapter results in physical or electrical
contact With any high voltage overhead line, the contractor committing the
violation ·shall be liable to the public utility owning or operating the high
voltage overhead line for all damages to the facilities and all costs and
expenses, including damages to third persons, incurred by the public utility
as a result ofthe contact.

Idaho Code§ 55-2404(2).(emphasis added).
Lamar mistakenly misquotes Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140
Idaho 144, 150, 90 P.3d 894 (2004) to support its theory that KEC's claim accrued when KEC
incurred "some damage." (Resp. Br. at 46) The. Nerco Court, however, simply acknowledges
"that there must be some damage for the cause of action to accrue," citing to Lapham v. Stewart,
137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P;3d 396 (2002). The Lapham Court merely acknowledges that the
element of damages is essential to recover damages. Lapham, 137 Idaho at 586 ("The basis of
the 'some damage'requirement is that in order to have a cause of action to recover damages, the
plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered some damage, or at least is entitled to recover
nominal damages.") In the case at bar, the element of damages was conclusively established in
the October 29, 2002 Judgment. Neither Nerco nor Lapham supports Lamar's theory that
KEC's claim for indemnification accrued the moment it first incurred a cost or expense.
Lamar continues to ignore the dual aspect of the HVA and the applicable law of when a
• cause of action accrues and, therefore, when it can be brought. The Idaho HVA has separate

48

sections addressing duty, and thereafter, enforcement/damages/indemnification provisions.
Idaho Code§ 55-2401 et seq. addresses Lamar's affirmative duty to give notice, followed by the

remedial provisions in § 55s2404, which provides for indemnification when § 55-2401 et seq.
has been violated, and the violation results in a physieal or electrical contact to a third person.
Any amount that KEC pays to a third person, thereby incurring damages, is entitled to statutory
indemnification.
The Jaw in Idaho, as elsewhere, is that a cause of action for indemnification does not
accrue until damages have been awarded against the party seeking indemnification. This is true
regardless of whether indemnification is grounded in equity or statutes. Beitzel v. Orton, 121
Idaho 709 (1992).. The Beitzel Court reaffirmed its long line of cases holding that until and
unless liability is ·first found adverse to the claimed indemnitee to a third person, the right to
indemnification does not arise. Similarly, in Idaho's sister state, the Washington Supreme Court
made the following statement as to when an action for indemnification accrues in Central
Refrigeration, Inc. v. Barbee, 133 Wn.2d 509,513,946 P.2d 760 (1997):

Indemnity actions are distinct, separate causes of action from the underlying
wrong and are governed by separate statutes of limitations. It is settled law that
indemnity actions accrue when the party seekirig indemnity pays or is legally
adjudged obligated to pay damages to a third .party.
: Id. at 516.

Applying the holdings of the Supreme Courts of Idaho, Washington, and Texas, as well
. every other jurisdiction in the United States, KEC's separate cause of action against Lamar for
, indemnity did not accrue until the Court formally entered Judgment in favor of James Kuntz and
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against KEC, which obligated KEC to pay damages to a third party. KEC's claim for relief was
timely commenced .vithin two months of the October 2002 Judgment. The trial court's ruling
should be affirmed.
V. CONCLUSION

KEC respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's granting of Lamar's
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to res judicata; affirm the Trial Court's ruling that
KEC's indemnity claim was filed within the statute of limitations, and that the comparative fault
scheme does not apply to statutC>ry indemnity; .and remand.this .case for trial on KEC's right to
statutory indemnification pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 55-2404(2); and in so doing, satisfy the
purpose and policy behind Idaho's High Voltage Act in a manner consistent with Idaho Court
Rules.
Respectfully submitted this
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